Mobile devices with rich features can record videos, traffic parameters or air quality readings along user trajectories. Although such data may be valuable, users are seldom rewarded for collecting them. Emerging digital marketplaces allow owners to advertise their data to interested buyers. We focus on geo-marketplaces, where buyers search data based on geo-tags. Such marketplaces present significant challenges. First, if owners upload data with revealed geo-tags, they expose themselves to serious privacy risks. Second, owners must be accountable for advertised data, and must not be allowed to subsequently alter geo-tags. Third, such a system may be vulnerable to intensive spam activities, where dishonest owners flood the system with fake advertisements. We propose a geo-marketplace that addresses all these concerns. We employ searchable encryption, digital commitments, and blockchain to protect the location privacy of owners while at the same time incorporating accountability and spam-resilience mechanisms. We implement a prototype with two alternative designs that obtain distinct trade-offs between trust assumptions and performance. Our experiments on real location data show that one can achieve the above design goals with practical performance and reasonable financial overhead.
INTRODUCTION
The mobile computing landscape is witnessing an unprecedented number of devices that can acquire geo-tagged data, e.g., mobile phones, wearable sensors, in-vehicle dashcams, and IoT sensors. These devices, owned by a diverse set of entities, can collect large Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org. SIGSPATIAL '19, November 5-8, 2019 , Chicago, IL, USA © 2019 Association for Computing Machinery. ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-6909-1/19/11. . . $15.00 https://doi.org /10.1145/3347146.3359072 amounts of data such as images, videos, movement parameters, or environmental measurements. The data may be useful to third-party entities interested in gathering information from a certain location. For example, journalists may want to gather images around an event of interest for their newspaper; law enforcement may seek images taken soon before or after a crime occurred; and city authorities may be interested in travel patterns during heavy traffic.
Currently, data collected by individuals are often discarded or archived, due to lack of storage space. Even when data are shared, owners are seldom rewarded for their contributions. An emerging trend is to create data marketplaces where owners advertise their data objects to potential buyers. We emphasize that marketplaces differ from crowdsourcing services such as Amazon Mechanical Turk. In crowdsourcing, data are owned by the service provider, and the user receives a small reward for a task, e.g., a few cents for classifying an image. In contrast, with data marketplaces users own the data and advertise them to buyers. If an object is appealing (e.g., a photo purchased by a newspaper), the buyer may pay a higher price (in the order of tens of dollars or more), resulting in different cost and scalability considerations.
Geo-marketplaces, where entities trade geo-tagged data objects, raise unique concerns. Publishing geo-tags in clear reveals owners' whereabouts, which may lead to serious privacy breaches such as leakage of one's health status or political orientation. In addition, one must also protect the interests of buyers, and ensure they receive data objects satisfying their spatial requirements. Owners must be held accountable for their advertised data and not be able to change the geo-tag of an object after its initial advertisement. This can prevent situations where owners change geo-tags to reflect ongoing trends in buyers' interest. For example, when a certain highprofile event occurs at a location, dishonest owners may attempt to change their geo-tags closer to that location in order to sell their images at higher prices. Furthermore, the system must provide strong disincentives to prevent spam behavior, where dishonest participants flood the system with fake advertisements.
We propose a geo-marketplace with three key features: Privacy. We adapt state-of-the-art searchable encryption (SE) techniques to protect locations, and we perform matching between buyer interests and advertised objects on encrypted geo-tags. Accountability. To hold owners accountable for their advertisements, we use cryptographic commitments and blockchain technology. We store a compact digital commitment on the blockchain to prevent owners from altering object geo-tags after publication.
Spam-Resilience. We employ the use of a public blockchain, where writing to the ledger requires a transaction fee. We control the cost such that legitimate users only pay negligible fees relative to the value of their objects, whereas dishonest users who flood the system with fake advertisements are strongly disincentivized.
In our design, the data owner generates a metadata item which includes the object's geo-tag. The bulk data (e.g., image or video), is either stored by the owner (e.g., flash drive), or encrypted with conventional encryption at a bulk storage service, such as Swarm [11] or InterPlanet File System [10] . The low-footprint geo-tag metadata is encrypted using SE. The owner then creates a digital commitment of the metadata and stores it on the blockchain. Commitments can be stored either individually, or batched together for better blockchain efficiency and cost.
Buyers search objects based on geo-tags by querying the encrypted metadata. They must first obtain a search token that allows them to identify encrypted objects that match their spatial range query. Since processing on encrypted data is computationally expensive, if the buyers decide to use other services to perform the task, they often need to pay for the search token and its processing. In our system model, different strategies are investigated to ensure that the performance and financial cost of the search process are practical. It is important to remark that the encrypted search reveals neither the exact whereabouts of the objects, nor the owner's identity. The buyer learns only pseudonymous owner identifiers for matching objects, e.g., a blockchain public key, through which the transaction can be anonymously completed. Once matching objects are identified, the owner and buyer enter a smart contract through the blockchain. As a result, the owner receives payment, and the buyer receives the actual data objects, and the corresponding conventional decryption keys.
Achieving the three aforementioned objectives is challenging. First, SE techniques incur significant overhead compared to the search on plaintexts, especially with asymmetric encryption. Thus, carefully designing data and query encodings is essential to obtain efficient solutions that can be scaled to large datasets. Second, the cost of privacy and accountability should not be too high; otherwise, it may interfere with the financial operation of the marketplace, resulting in prohibitive costs. An acceptable financial cost should only account for a small percentage of the transaction value.
Our specific contributions include:
• We propose a novel architecture for a geo-marketplace that achieves privacy, accountability, and spam resilience by combining searchable encryption, digital commitments, and blockchain. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work aiming to accomplish these objectives. • We propose protocols for owner-buyer matching with both symmetric and asymmetric SE. These approaches offer an interesting trade-off between trust assumptions and performance, facilitating adoption in a wide range of scenarios. • We develop optimization techniques to address the high computational cost of encrypted search. We also consider techniques to decrease the financial cost of blockchain operations by reducing the amount of on-chain storage. • We perform an extensive experimental evaluation to measure system performance, in terms of computational overhead, storage, and financial cost incurred.
Sec. 2 provides background information on the different components of the system, followed by an overview of the system model and operations workflow in Sec. 3. We present technical details in Sec. 4 and experimental results in Sec. 5. We review related work in Sec. 6 and conclude with directions for future research in Sec. 7.
BACKGROUND
Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) allows a client to search and selectively retrieve her encrypted documents outsourced to a server. SSE was first proposed in [31] and further refined in [8, 15] . The first efficient sub-linear SSE scheme that supports Boolean queries was proposed in [6] . Later on, [32] proposed a scheme that achieves forward security by protecting access patterns at the time of document addition. State-of-the-art SSE schemes are efficient, but at the expense of some leakage in the form of access patterns.
In our system, we use the recently-proposed HXT technique [23] which supports conjunctive keyword queries.
Let d 0 , . . . , d n−1 be the client's documents and I an inverted index that maps a keyword w to the list of document identifiers containing w. We denote the list of document identifiers that contain w as I (w). An SSE scheme consists of the following four algorithms: 1) Setup is run by the client and takes as input security parameter k and documents d 0 , . . . , d n−1 . It generates two secret keys K I and K D . It parses all the documents and forms an inverted index I that maps to each keyword w a list of document identifiers (I (w)) that contain w. The client encrypts this index using a special encryption algorithm specified by the particular SSE scheme and generates an encrypted inverted index using the key K I . It also encrypts each document d i , ∀0 ≤ i < n, with conventional symmetric encryption (e.g., AES) using the key K D and assigns it a unique identifier that is independent of the document contents. It outputs the keys K I and K D that are stored locally at the client and the encrypted index that is sent to the server. 2) Token Generation, run by the client, takes as input secret key K I and a keyword w. Using secret key K I , it creates a search token tk w which is sent to the server.
3) Search is run by the server and uses as input the token tk w and the encrypted index. It searches the encrypted index and retrieves the list of document identifiers that contain the keyword w, namely I (w). The server retrieves the encrypted documents d w 0 , . . . , d w |I (w ) |−1 using the identifiers in I (w) and sends the documents to the client. 4) Decryption is run by the client and uses the secret key K D to decrypt the documents received from the server. Hidden Vector Encryption (HVE) [3, 4] is an asymmetric searchable encryption technique supporting conjunctive equality, range and subset queries. Search on ciphertexts can be performed with respect to a number of index attributes. HVE represents an attribute as a bit vector (each element has value 0 or 1), and the search predicate as a pattern vector where each element can be 0, 1 or '*' (i.e., wildcard value). Let l denote the HVE width, which is the bit length of the attribute, and consequently that of the search predicate. A predicate evaluates to True for a ciphertext C if the attribute vector I used to encrypt C has the same values as the pattern vector of the predicate in all positions that are not '*' in the latter.
HVE is built on top of a symmetric bilinear map of composite order [2] , which is a function e : G × G → G T such that ∀a, b ∈ G and ∀u, ∈ Z it holds that e(a u , b ) = e(a, b) u . G and G T are cyclic multiplicative groups of composite order n = p · q where p and q are large primes of equal bit length. We emphasize that the application of function e, which is called a bilinear pairing, is expensive to compute, so the number of pairings must be minimized. We denote by G p , G q the subgroups of G of orders p and q, respectively. HVE consists of the following four algorithms: 1) Setup. The private/public key pair (SK/PK) are as follows:
.l] and R ∈ G q 2) Encryption uses PK and takes as parameters index attribute I and message M ∈ G T . The following random elements are generated: Z, Z i,1 , Z i,2 ∈ G q and s ∈ Z n . The ciphertext is:
Using SK, and given a search predicate encoded as pattern vector I * , the TA generates a search token T K as follows: let be the set of all indices i where I * [i] * . TA randomly generates r i,1 and r i,2 ∈ Z p , ∀i ∈ . Then
Query is executed at the server, and evaluates if the predicate represented by T K holds for ciphertext C. The server attempts to determine the value of M as
If the index I on which C was computed satisfies T K, the value of M is returned, otherwise a nil value ⊥ is obtained. Vector Digital Commitments. Cryptographic commitments [29] allow a party S to commit to a message m by creating a commitment CC, such that CC is binding (i.e., S cannot change the message m) and hiding (i.e., CC does not leak any information about m). In this work, we use vector commitments [7] , which allow party S to commit to an ordered sequence of messages (m 0 , . . . , m q−1 ), such that it can later open the commitment for a specific message, e.g., to prove that m i is the i-th message in the sequence. Vector commitments are space-efficient because their size is independent of the number of committed values. A vector commitment scheme is defined by the following four algorithms: 1) KeyGen takes as input security parameter k and size q of committed vector and outputs a public parameter pp.
2) Commit takes as input a sequence of q messages V = m 0 , . . . , m q−1 , the public parameter pp and outputs a commitment string CC and an auxiliary information aux.
3) Open takes as input a message m ∈ m 0 , . . . , m q−1 , a position i, and the auxiliary information aux and is run by the committer to produce a proof P i that m is the i-th message in the committed message vector V .
4)
Verify takes as input the commitment string CC, a message m, a position i, and the proof P i , to verify that P i is a valid proof that CC was created to a sequence m 0 , . . . , m q−1 , where m = m i . Blockchain, Smart Contracts and Bulk Storage. Blockchain was first introduced in [27] as a decentralized public ledger that records transactions among entities without a trusted party. A blockchain is a sequence of transaction blocks cryptographicallylinked through the hash value of the predecessor. A transaction typically moves cryptocurrency from one account to another. An account is defined as the public key of an entity, which provides pseudonymity. System nodes called miners compete to create new blocks by solving proof-of-work puzzles. The miner who finds the puzzle solution first is rewarded with cryptocurrency. Some blockchain platforms (e.g., Ethereum), have the ability to execute smart contracts [34] , which are sophisticated agreements among entities that utilize transactions on the blockchain. Smart contracts are expressed in a high-level programming language (e.g., Solidity) interpreted by a blockchain virtual machine. One limitation when storing data on the blockchain is size. Due to the competitive nature of block creation, the growth rate of the blockchain is limited. Recently, decentralized storage systems have been proposed that interface with the blockchain and allow large amounts of storage (e.g., Swarm [11] ). Such systems provide a distributed hash table (DHT) interface [33] to store and retrieve data. Participating peers receive incentives for the contributed storage.
SYSTEM MODEL
The central component in our design is the blockchain, and its associated on-chain operations. On-chain storage is financially expensive, since write operations to the chain translate into transaction blocks added to the ledger. We aim to minimize the amount of onchain storage. Only digital commitments and minimal addressing information is stored on-chain. For all other data structures, we employ bulk storage (Swarm). Another challenging part of the system is matching owners' data to buyers' requests. This process involves search on encrypted location metadata, which is computationally expensive, especially in the case of asymmetric searchable encryption. Searchable ciphertexts tend to be large in size compared to corresponding plaintexts, in order to support conjunctive queries and hide data patterns. In the case of SSE, metadata ciphertexts and associated indexes are also placed in bulk storage.
We present evaluation metrics in Section 3.1, followed by two alternative system designs: in Section 3.2 we present a solution based on SSE, which achieves sub-linear search performance, thanks to the use of an encrypted index. However, this approach requires a trusted curator (TC), which holds the secret encryption key, and has access to the plaintext locations of all object geo-tags. In Section 3.3, we propose an asymmetric encryption design, where each owner has the public key of a private/public key pair. Owners encrypt locations using Hidden Vector Encryption (HVE). There is still need for a trusted authority (TA) that holds the private key and generates search tokens at runtime, but this entity does not have access to plaintext locations. While in principle it is possible for the TA to collude with buyers and issue numerous search tokens that may reveal all object locations, such an attack is more difficult to stage. We assume that the TA is non-colluding. In addition, it is possible to use multiple TAs, so the amount of disclosure in the case of location sharing scheme for telecare medical information systems. However, in their system, locations are encrypted using an orderpreserving encryption scheme, which is known to incur significant leakage. Closer to our work, [19] uses the blockchain-based model to protect locations of smart vehicles; however, their privacy model relies on random identifiers and enlargement of reported areas providing only ad-hoc protection, as opposed to our solution that inherits the strong protection of encryption. In the context of data exchange and marketplaces for location data using blockchain, [36] proposed a system based on conventional encryption, which does not support search on ciphertexts. Fysical [26] is a blockchainbased marketplace where suppliers can sell plaintext or aggregated location data, which raises serious privacy issues.
There are some important lines of works orthogonal to our approach. One direction focuses on creating proofs of location using blockchain [1, 5, 13, 25] . The recently-proposed Hawk [20] system is a blockchain model that provides transactional privacy such that private bids and financial data are hidden from public view. Zhang et. al [35] proposed GEM 2 -tree for authenticated range queries with off-chain storage. Such approaches can be integrated into our system to allow validation of the geo-tags, hiding transactions, or validate results from our searchable encrypted indices.
CONCLUSION
We proposed a blockchain-based privacy-preserving, accountable and spam-resilient marketplace for geospatial data which allows owners and buyers to be matched using only encrypted location information. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first approach to achieve these important desiderata. In future work, we will investigate architectures that eliminate the need for trusted entities or reduce the amount of information that is made available to such entities. In addition, we will explore alternative data encodings and encrypted processing techniques to further reduce system overhead. We will also investigate how our results can be extended to other types of data, not only geo-spatial attributes.
